Waiting Your Turn: Sibling Rivalry, Birth Order, and Dowry in Rural India
with Ajinkya Keskar and Sulagna Mookerjee · R&R at Labour Economics
In societies with strong birth-order marriage norms and marital payments, same-sex siblings create queue pressure, and additional daughters can split a family's dowry-paying capacity, limiting the matches it can finance. We estimate how sibling gender composition and birth order affect household formation in rural India using the 1999 Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, which records age at marriage, own education, spouse education, and dowry transfers for all siblings in sampled households. Women with a next-younger sister marry husbands with 0.32 fewer years of education and pay Rs. 13,034 less in dowry; among closely spaced sisters, they marry 0.35 years earlier. We document a novel parallel pattern for men: those with a next-younger brother have 0.26 fewer years of education, marry earlier, and match with a less-educated spouse, while their dowry receipts remain unchanged. Family fixed-effects estimates show a later-born advantage in marriage timing, education, spouse quality, and transfers. The results show that the effects of sibling composition are not confined to daughters: they also shape sons' human capital and matches, while marital transfers respond asymmetrically by gender.